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IN THE WAKE OF SAKHALIN II:  
HOW NON-GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION  
OF NATURAL RESOURCES COULD STRENGTHEN 
RUSSIA’S ENERGY SECTOR 
Nowell David Beckett Bamberger† 
Abstract: Russia’s economically vital oil and gas industry is at a crossroads.  
Although foreign investment favored European nations in the wake of the Soviet 
collapse, in recent years American and European oil and gas companies have invested 
billions of dollars in Russia’s energy development and export distribution sectors.  
However, the 2006 restructuring of the $20 billion Sakhalin II project demonstrates that 
Russia’s energy sector has still not stabilized from the turbulent privatization of the 
1990s.  This comment explores the legal structures and Government policies affecting 
Russia’s oil and gas industry for evidence of the causes of institutional instability.  It 
argues that to prevent political and business elites from continuing to manipulate the 
country’s most profitable industry, Russia’s energy resources should be administered by 
an independent entity, a Public Leasing Authority.  By creating a new institution with 
transparent motives, Russia may be able to remove the historic temptation to use 
economic regulation to accomplish short-term political goals and thereby enhance the 
stability of its energy sector and its larger economy. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 18, 2006, the Russian government set off a firestorm of 
international criticism when President Vladimir Putin recommended the 
cancellation of permits for the controversial Sakhalin II development project 
in Russia’s Far East.1  The Sakhalin Project, managed by an international 
consortium including Royal Dutch Shell, Mitsubishi, and Mitsui, has been 
developing infrastructure for the removal of Liquefied Natural Gas (“LNG”) 
off the coast of Russia’s Sakhalin Oblast since forming in 1994.2  The 
seeming collapse of the project, just short of its 2007 expected completion 
date, raises new questions for foreign investors in Russia’s energy sector.  
Namely, how can positive, productive, and responsible foreign investment 
be encouraged? 
                                           
†
  The author would like to thank the staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for the 
interminable attention to detail and relentless pursuit of conciseness that has made this a better comment; 
Professors Sylvia Kang’ara and Veronica Taylor at the University of Washington School of Law for 
editorial assistance; and Associate Professor Cheryl Beckett, Director of Legal Research and Writing at 
Gonzaga University School of Law, for teaching him how to write.  All errors in form or substance are the 
author’s own. 
1
  Criticism of Sakhalin Energy not grounds for halting Sakhalin II oil and gas project, INTERFAX: 
POLAND BUSINESS NEWSWIRE, September 21, 2006. 
2
  EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, Factsheet: Understanding the 
Project and Process, http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/factsh/themes/sakhalin.pdf. 
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Like many foreign investments in Russia’s energy sector, the 
Sakhalin II project was structured under a Production Sharing Agreement 
(“PSA”) between the Sakhalin Energy Investment Corporation (“SEIC”) and 
the government of the Russian Federation.3  Russia’s use of the PSA model 
was a response to the realization that the country’s mainline economy was 
too unstable to attract more traditional forms of investment in an economic 
sector where profitability only follows from massive front-end capital 
expenditure.4  Yet in Russia, the PSA model has failed to shield existing 
investment from domestic politics and consequently failed to encourage new 
international investment. 
This comment will argue that the Sakhalin experience demonstrates 
deficiencies in Russia’s current institutional structure for foreign energy 
investment.  The current structure is unsustainable in a world economy that 
increasingly demands calculable risks and reliable expectations.  A new 
model for pairing international expertise with Russian resources is necessary 
to develop a stable, predictable, and profitable domestic energy development 
and exploration sector.  
Part II explores the collapse5 of the Sakhalin II agreement in the wider 
context of Russia’s search for foreign investment, economic and legal 
stability, and international acceptance as a dominant economic power.  Part 
III addresses the shortcomings of the current approach to international 
energy contracting under PSAs.  Part IV explores the need for Russia to take 
a new approach to achieve its goals for developing its energy resources 
through foreign investment.  Finally, Part V prescribes a new institutional 
solution in response to the deficient institutions and political manipulation 
that led to Sakhalin’s demise.  The creation of a quasi-governmental Public 
Leasing Authority, which would stand as a buffer between international 
investors and the Russian government, would enable Russia to stimulate 
foreign investment by insulating international firms from the substantial 
risks and liabilities associated with doing business in Russia. 
                                           
3
  Russia says to honor PSAs, as Sakhalin energy project woes mount, RAI NOVOSTI [Russian 
Information Agency], September 19, 2006. 
4
  Id. 
5
  It has been suggested that the Sakhalin II agreement did not, in fact, collapse but was rather 
restructured under government pressure to create a new framework for development.  When addressing 
such a politically charged issue as government interference in private investment, word choice can be 
determinative.  It is the author’s suggestion that, while the Sakhalin II project continues (albeit in a 
radically new iteration) the Sakhalin II agreement (the legal framework under which the project was 
developed) did collapse of both its own insufficiency and strong government pressure. 
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II. FOREIGN INVESTMENT IS INDISPENSABLE TO DEVELOP RUSSIA’S 
ENERGY SECTOR AND TO DRIVE RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC RESURGENCE 
In the last several years Russia has profited from historically high 
energy prices and an unquenchable demand for the 40% of the world’s 
natural gas that underlies its enormous territory.6  The economic 
independence generated by energy wealth has prompted an ambiguous 
government approach to foreign investment in the energy sector. 7  Yet 
mismanaging foreign investment opportunities threatens to cut off the flow 
of foreign technology, expertise, and capital, which have been the drivers of 
increasing production since post-Soviet privatization.  In the long term, 
Russia must develop stable institutions for regulating foreign energy 
investment to fortify its economy against economic and energy-price 
instability.   
A. In the Long Term, Russia Cannot Rely on Profitable Oil Exports to 
Underpin its Economy or to Ameliorate the Problems in its Energy 
Sector 
In spite of very real development problems, Russia is an extractive 
energy powerhouse.  The territory of the modern Russian Federation boasts 
the world’s eighth largest proven reserves of oil and is the world’s second-
largest oil producer after Saudi Arabia.8  It is home to the world’s largest 
natural gas reserves,9 which when included in its overall production make 
Russia the world’s leading hydrocarbon exporting state.10  However, even 
extraordinary energy-sector performance has proven barely sufficient to 
sustain the country’s oil and gas–dependent national economy.11 
                                           
6
  In 2004 the chairman of Shell’s Russia operations commented that “[a]ll natural-resources 
companies have to go where the natural resources are . . . . Russia is by definition very important.  It is 
where the opportunities lie.”  Tracy Boles, Special Report: Make or Break for Shell in Russia, THE TIMES 
(LONDON), March 12, 2006. 
7
  Foreign investment, particularly in the technology-dependent oil and gas industry, has historically 
undermined the development of domestic industrial capacity because foreign multinational firms tend to be 
more competitive than their domestic counterparts.  See Quan Li & Adam Resnick, Reversal of Fortunes: 
Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2003), at 183. 
8
  Russia: Back to the Future?  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. 
(June 29, 2006) (statement of Amy Myers Jaffe, Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies, James A. 
Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University), available at http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/ 
testimony/2006/JaffeTestimony060629.pdf.  
9
  Tomas W. Waelde, International Energy Investment, 17 ENERGY L. J. 191, 210 (1996). 
10
  Russia: Back to the Future?, supra note 8. 
11
  Symposium, The Russian Petroleum Legislation Project at the University of Houston Law Center, 
Gary B. Conine, Petroleum Licensing: Formulating an Approach for the New Russia, 15 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 
317, 327-329 (1993). 
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State control of energy resources is vitally important to the Russian 
government.12  Russia’s $975 billion (US) (2006) national economy, the 
tenth largest in the world,13 is precariously perched on a branch held by its 
three largest national energy companies:  privately-held OAO Lukoil14 and 
state-controlled OAO Gazprom and OAO Rosneft.  Of the three, Gazprom, 
in which the Russian government holds a 38.37% controlling stake,15 has 
shown itself to be the most aggressive in attempting to monopolize Russian 
gas production.16   
Russia would be in dire financial straits without a strong energy sector 
for two reasons.  First, Russia has not benefited from the same foreign 
investment as its former communist neighbors.  From 1988 through 1994 
Russia’s share of Foreign Direct Investment amounted to just $3.5 billion 
(US), less than half of the total investment in Hungary and six times less 
than in Slovenia on a per-capita basis.17  During the same period, foreign 
investors completely forewent opportunities to invest in the western-style oil 
and gas concessions offered by the Russian government.  Second, because 
energy sales provide the only reliable source of foreign hard currency, a 
rapid decline in oil and gas profits could lead to defaults on foreign 
development loans, and consequently to economic collapse.18 
                                           
12
  It was estimated that in 2002, each dollar increase in the world market price for crude oil 
generated between $1.5 and 2 billion (US) in oil export revenues for the Russian government.  Clifford G. 
Gaddy, Has Russia Entered a Period of Sustainable Economic Growth?, in RUSSIA AFTER THE FALL 130 
(Andrew C. Kuchins, ed., 2002)  Given Russia’s significant increase in oil exports since that time, the value 
of high oil prices is likely even greater today. 
13
  World Economic Outlook Database for September 2006, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/02/data/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2006) (Download “By 
Countries,” “All Countries” by “Gross Domestic Product, current prices (U.S. dollars)”). 
14
  Lukoil is the world’s second largest non-state holder of proven oil reserves.  Andrew E. Kramer, 
Lukoil, N.Y. TIMES TOPICS, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/l/lukoil/ 
index.html (last visited Jan. 22 2006). 
15
  Gazprom in Figures 2002-2004, 13 (fact book prepared by the company for the 2005 OAO 
Gazprom annual General shareholders meeting), available at http://www.gazprom.com/documents/ 
Statistika%20En.pdf. 
16
  Although Lukoil is the larger producer of petroleum, Gazprom’s roughly 110 billion proven 
barrels of natural gas reserves, the largest in the world, gives the company, and through it the Russian 
Government, a virtual monopoly on Russian natural gas production. See Laura A. Wakefield, Note, The 
Need for Comprehensive Legislation in the Russian Oil and Gas Industries, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
149, 160 (1997). 
17
  Conine, supra note 11, at 431. 
18
  Daniel Kimmage, The Fog Before the War, RFE/RL BUSINESS WATCH, 5 Nov. 2002, reprinted in 
JOHNSON’S RUSSIA LIST 6536 #16 (David Johnson, ed., 6 Nov. 2002), available at 
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6536.cfm; Abbigail Chiodo & Michael T. Owyang, A Case Study of a 
Currency Crisis: The Russian Default of 1998, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW, Vol. 
84, No. 6 at 12 (2002) (explaining the root causes of Russia’s 1998 loan default and resulting economic 
consequences).  See also Mark A. Stoleson, Investment at an Impasse: Russia’s Production-Sharing 
Agreement Law and the Continuing Barriers to Petroleum Investment in Russia, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 671, 674 (1997) (explaining the fragility of Russia’s reliance on energy to underpin its economy). 
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The current regime in Moscow believes foreign capital investment to 
be largely unnecessary, as it uses its foreign income from oil and gas exports 
to underwrite its economic expansion.19  This economic situation, somewhat 
reminiscent of the Soviet situation in the late 1980’s, is momentary at best.20  
Oil prices are at historic highs.21  As Mikhail Gorbachev did in the late 
1980s, President Putin has used the money from oil and gas sales to pay off 
foreign debts, infuse cash into the major economic centers of Moscow and 
St. Petersburg, and reinforce Russia’s economic clout on the international 
stage.22  Yet, all is not as rosy as the Kremlin likes to suggest.  Russia is 
currently producing oil and gas at capacity, while its main competitor, Saudi 
Arabia, is producing at less than two-thirds of capacity.23  Future increases in 
production must therefore necessarily come from new exploration and 
development.  Those efforts are completely dependent on foreign expertise, 
equipment, and investment.24  Gazprom lacks the resources, both technical 
and managerial, to effectively develop a growing portfolio of enterprises.25   
                                           
19
  A Deal is a Deal, THE TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 22, 2006, at 23. 
20
  Russian energy policy has always been used as an instrument to accomplish larger political 
objectives.  During the main of the Soviet expansionist period, oil production rose each year, buoyed 
mainly by new exploration and new production, because Soviet technology continued to lag behind that of 
competing Western firms.  Conine, supra note 11, at 324-25.  This increasing production helped insulate 
the Soviet economy from the energy shortages and economic vulnerabilities of the late 1960s and early 
1970s.  In the late 1980s central planners used Russia’s 440 billion (US) in oil export revenues to reinforce 
the communist system, but little was reinvested in exploration, diminishing future development capacity.  
C.I.S. Oil Woes Laid at Feet of Underspending for Exploration, OIL AND GAS JOURNAL 44 (May 4, 1992). 
21
  It was estimated that in 2002, each dollar increase in the world market price for crude oil 
generated between $1.5 and 2 billion (US) in oil export revenues for the Russian government.  Gaddy, 
supra note 12, at 130-136.  
22
  Kevin O’flynn, Too Much Money, NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL, Sept. 12, 2005 available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9191050/site/newsweek/.  See also Arkady Ostrovsky, Kremlin Makes Life 
Difficult on Sakhalin, FINANCIAL TIMES: FT.COM, Nov. 22, 2006, available at 
www.sakhalinenergy.com/docs/media/en/194/FT_22-11-06_en_no%20map.doc (arguing that the benefits 
of Sakhalin development are not being shared with the local community). 
23
  James Schofield, Russia’s Oil Renaissance, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, June 24, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2058214.stm (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
24
  Id. 
25
  Gazprom’s Gas Grab, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at 14.  Non-development aspects of the 
Russian energy industry are similarly in need of Western investment.  In particular, Russia’s pipeline 
infrastructure, important in times of high oil prices but critical for efficient oil and gas transport when 
prices fall, is completely inadequate.  Transneft, the State pipeline monopoly, has proven unable to meet 
the international and domestic demand for export capacity, and the nation has begun to look to international 
sources for pipeline development assistance. Bernard A. Gelb, CRS Report to Congress: Russian Oil and 
Gas Challenges (RL33212), U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Jan. 3, 2006, at 3 (on file with the 
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal). 
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B. The Production Sharing Agreement Structure Has Successfully 
Encouraged Investment in Developing Countries 
In post-Soviet Russia, it quickly became clear that the Soviet-era laws 
“On Foreign Investment”26 and “On Subsoil Resources,”27 signed in 1990 
and 1992 respectively, provided insufficient guarantees against political and 
economic uncertainty to attract foreign investors.28  As Russia evolved from 
a command economy to a capitalist economy, the most formidable challenge 
to foreign investors was the risk of unforeseeable legislative changes.29  In 
response to a lack of foreign investment in oil and gas, President Yeltsin 
signed a decree “on Production Sharing Agreements for the Use of 
Underground Resources” in late 1993.30  Lacking statutory credibility 
because the State Duma refused to ratify the Decree, this initial framework 
was not successful in attracting favorable foreign investment.31  Some 
agreements, like the Sakhalin II Agreement, were concluded, although on 
internationally non-standard terms that tended to strongly advantage the 
foreign party. 
The use of PSAs is a relatively straightforward way of allocating the 
political and economic risks inherent in foreign oil exploration.  They were 
first introduced as a vehicle for foreign investment in energy exploration by 
Indonesia in 196632 which, at that time, was responding to many of the same 
problems that Russia currently faces.33  The principle characteristics that 
make the PSA structure acceptable to both an autocratic regime and foreign 
investors are:  1) continued state-ownership of the underlying natural 
resource (rather than concession to a foreign entity), 2) a self-contained 
                                           
26
  Decree of the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Foreign Investments in the 
USSR (Oct. 26, 1990). 
27
  Federal Law No. 2395-1 on Subsoil Resources (Feb. 21, 1992). 
28
  PAUL CHAISTY, LEGISLATIVE POLITICS AND ECONOMIC POWER IN RUSSIA 175 (2006). 
29
  Yuri Petrov, former director of the State Investment Corporation (SIC) was quoted in 1993 
commenting that “change in legislation is the biggest risk facing potential investors [in Russia]”.  Stoleson, 
supra note 18, at 679.  
30
  Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Production Sharing Agreements gor The Use 
of Underground Resources, No. 2285 (Dec. 24, 1993).  This decree was invalidated by later executive 
action.  See Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Invalidating Decree No. 2285, No. 1275 
(Aug. 28 1996). 
31
  Stoleson, supra note 18, at 675.  
32
  The Indonesian Government nationalized foreign-owned property during the early 1960s, and 
offered foreign oil companies an alternative to the ordinary oil concession:  a new self-contained agreement 
whereby foreign firms could extract oil from State-owned fields in exchange for a percentage of the 
developed oil.   See David N. Smith & Louis T. Wells, Jr., Mineral Agreements in Developing Countries: 
Structures and Substance, AM. J. OF INT’L L., Vol. 69, No. 3, 560, 586 (1975).   
33
  Kristen Bindemann, Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis 1 (1999) (on file 
with the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal). 
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agreement, entirely insulated from the domestic regulatory regime, and 
ostensibly guaranteed against further state expropriation, and 3) payment to 
the host regime in crude oil, rather than currency, providing both a guarantee 
against under-pricing of oil in sale by the development company to its 
foreign affiliates34  and State access to a strategic resource.  
Under a typical agreement, the host country bears the risk of political 
instability35 while the foreign investor shoulders the entire exploration risk.36  
The inclusion of all relevant terms within the four corners of the agreement 
insulates the foreign investor from changes to the domestic regulatory or 
legal environment.37  At the same time, the foreign investor must front the 
entire cost of exploration, yet receives no compensation if no oil is found.38  
PSAs are typically signed for a fixed period and disputes are typically 
assigned to the jurisdiction of an international arbitral forum rather than the 
national courts of the host country.39 
Unlike ordinary mineral concessions, the State only profits under a 
PSA if resources are actually recovered.  After exploration is complete and 
development begins, the “production-sharing” element of the agreements 
kicks in.  The oil found is first divided into “cost oil” and “profit oil.”40  The 
former is retained by the foreign investor to recoup the cost of development.  
In this way, the foreign investor (or, more correctly, its creditors) is paid 
first.41  The remaining profit oil is then divided between the host country and 
the foreign investor according to a predetermined proportion with the 
government virtually always receiving a greater percentage of the profit 
oil.42  Finally, according to the terms of the agreement, the foreign investor 
typically pays taxes on its operations, including export, income, and profit 
repatriation taxes.43  The taxes are paid in hard currency, in contrast to the 
share of production, which is provided in oil or gas.44  It is important to note 
that these are the elements of a typical agreement, and many countries have 
introduced additional elements, such as royalty payments and caps on cost 
                                           
34
  See Smith & Wells, supra note 32, at 587.  
35
  Bindemann, supra note 33, at 1. 
36
  Id. 
37
  Stoleson, supra note 18, at 682.  
38
  Id. 
39
  Ian Rutledge, The Sakhalin II PSA – A Production ‘Non-Sharing’ Agreement, Analysis of Revenue 
Distribution, Sheffield Energy & Resources Information Services, November 2004, at 13 (on file with the 
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).  
40
  Id. 
41
  See id  at 14.  
42
  Id. at 13. 
43
  Stoleson, supra note 18, at 678.  
44
  Smith & Wells, supra note 32, at 587. 
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recovery, that alter the financial relationship slightly but leave the allocation 
of risk intact.45 
III. RUSSIA’S AD-HOC PSA STRUCTURE HAS UNDERMINED EFFORTS TO 
COURT STABLE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
In a country of unorthodox investments, the Sakhalin II Production 
Sharing Agreement is truly outstanding.  The idea of international 
development of the Sakhalin Project46 began during the late Soviet period.  
In 1991 the Soviet Ministry of Oil and Gas was approached by Marathon 
Petroleum, MacDermott International Investment, and Mitsui and Co. about 
the prospects for development of explored gas reserves off the coast of 
Sakhalin Island.47  The successor Yeltsin government signed a PSA 
formalizing the agreement on June 22, 1994, without legislative approval.48  
By the time that the PSA legislation was passed, Royal Dutch Shell had 
become the majority stakeholder and the Sakhalin project was well 
underway.49 
A. The Non-Standard Profit Structure of Sakhalin II Provided Financial 
Incentives for Government Manipulation 
The Sakhalin II PSA is extraordinarily non-standard in both process 
and substance.  From a procedural perspective, it was enacted prior to 
                                           
45
  See generally Bindemann, supra note 33, at 13.  
46
  The Sakhalin II Project is actually a number of infrastructure improvement and development 
projects necessary to develop the Astokhskoye and Lunskoye natural gas fields off the coast of Sakhalin 
Island, just north of Japan.  The most important improvements are the construction of off-shore oil rigs, an 
export terminal for Liquefied Natural Gas (“LNG”) at the town of Korsakov on the southern tip of 
Sakhalin, and many miles of undersea and overland pipeline to connect them.  Also necessary are 
improvements to area roads, electricity infrastructure, the resettlement of those people and businesses that 
will be displaced by the development, and the mitigation of extensive environmental impacts. EUROPEAN 
BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 2, at 1. 
47
  Report of the Auditing Chamber of the Russian Federation in response to Decision of the State 
Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation No. 3994-P GD (May 20, 1999) [hereinafter 
“Auditing Chamber Report”] § 2.1 (Decision No. 39994-P GD authorized the State Auditing Chamber to 
audit both the Sakhalin I and Sakhalin II Production Sharing Agreements, including the activities of the 
parties (including the Russian Federation government) under those agreements). 
48
  Id. at § 2.11. 
49
  Controversially, the first phase of the development was backed by a 116 Million (US) loan from 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”).  EBRD Delays Financing of Sakhalin-
2 Second Stage, THE RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS REPORT NO., Nov. 15, 2006, at 116.  The EBRD, an institution 
created to support private enterprise in ex-Soviet countries struggles under a split mandate of profitable yet 
socially responsible investment.  In the wake of the Gazprom restructuring, the international financier 
concluded “it is not feasible for the EBRD to pursue the current project.”  Clare Watson, EBRD Withdraws 
Support for Sakhalin II Project, ENERGY BUSINESS REVIEW, Jan. 12, 2007, available at 
http://www.energy-business-review.com/article_news.asp?guid=6FC97F09-6BFC-4AEC-B76C-12EED52
8DCF8.  As of publication, this remains the Bank’s official position.   
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legislative authorization of PSAs.  A 1999 audit by the State Duma 
determined that because the authorization process was not standardized 
“insufficient measures were taken in the interests of the State on questions of 
ecology, resource use, tax and customs legislation, and state control . . . ”50  
The Duma concluded that by entering into a contract without competitive 
bidding, the agreement violated Russian Federation Law No. 2395-1 “On 
Resources.”51  However, a “grandfather” clause in the 1995 legislation “On 
Production Sharing Agreements” gave Sakhalin II ex post facto validity and 
made it enforceable.52 
Also unusual is that the Sakhalin II agreement guarantees a profit for 
SEIC, the foreign investor.  Typically, the investor bears both the risk that no 
oil will be discovered and the risk that the oil discovered will not be 
sufficient to cover costs, including payments to the host country.53  For 
Sakhalin II, however, there was no exploration risk.  Prior exploration by the 
Russian Government and Russian companies had already revealed 96 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas reserves.54  In addition to ameliorating exploration 
risk, the PSA’s peculiar revenue structuring scheme removed any risk that 
development itself would be prohibitively expensive.  Under the PSA, SEIC 
would retain all initial proceeds from development, until the capital 
investment was recovered and a 17.5% rate of return was realized.55  With a 
capital investment projected at $20 billion (US), the PSA assured SEIC a 
minimum $3.75 billion (US) profit.  The Russian Federation would have 
begun to share in revenue only after SEIC recovered its initial investment 
and profit.56  For the first two years thereafter, the Russian government 
would have received 10% of the gas, while SEIC was to retain 90%.  After 
that two-year period, the Russian government was to receive 50% of the gas 
until SEIC realized a 24% internal rate of return on its initial investment.  
                                           
50
  Auditing Chamber Report, supra note 47, at § 3.2. 
51
  Id. at § 3.4. 
52
  Id. at § 3.1.  
53
  Bindemann, supra note 33, at 1.  
54
  Sakhalin Island, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS, 
Sakhalin Island,  http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Sakhalin/Background.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
55
  Rutledge, supra note 39, at 15.  
56
  To be fair, the Russian government does receive money as a result of the project during the whole 
of the development process from its taxes on corporate profits, extraction, profit repatriation, and the value-
added tax.  These, however, are taxes recovered on all commercial activity within the Russian Federation 
and should be distinguished from the profits which are to be expected when the State gratuitously provides 
the commodity underlying the commercial activity.  Under a lease/concession system, the host government 
also recovers taxes in addition to royalty payments.  The Production Sharing Agreement is designed to 
substitute production sharing for royalty payments. 
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Only then would the Russian government begin to recover its permanent 
70% share of production.57 
The problem inherent with this particular agreement is that the risk 
was entirely allocated to the State, providing the foreign investors with little 
incentive to guarantee a profitable enterprise.  Because initial investments 
were to be deducted dollar for dollar from initial production, the money 
spent on exploration came from the State share of production, providing 
little incentive for SEIC (which was guaranteed a minimum 24% return) to 
limit expenses.58 
B. Although the Government Claims that Privatization of Russian 
Industry Has Ended, Economic Instability Remains 
The collapse of the Sakhalin II PSA illustrates the problem with long-
term investment in the Russian Federation’s energy sector:  massive 
investments in an economic sector that attracts such strong government 
scrutiny continue to be subject to government manipulation even after 
privatization has nominally been concluded.59  Since the early 1990s and to 
this day, the Kremlin has demonstrated that it is willing to follow the 
politically-expedient course of economic intervention to secure short-term 
profits at the expense of long-term stability.   
The trend first emerged in the energy context when, in 1993, U.S.-
based Amoco became the single largest foreign investor in Russia by 
purchasing a 50% stake in development at the Priobskoye oil field, the 
largest undeveloped oil field in Russia.60  The partner in the deal was 
Russia’s leading oil producer at the time:  OAO Yukos.  All went well until 
                                           
57
  Rutledge, supra note 39, at 15.  
58
  Id. 
59
  For more information about Russia’s turbulent post-Soviet privatization process, see Maxim 
Boyceko, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. VishnyVichney, Stanley Fischer & Jeffrey D. Sachs, Privatizing 
Russia, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, Vol. 1993, No. 2 at 140 (1993).  The true cost of 
privatization during the 1990s is just now becoming apparent.  It is manifest in a real and apparent rift in 
the fabric of Russian society, a consequence of the upset of the Soviet social contract that guaranteed all 
citizens a minimal level of subsistence. Judyth L. Twigg, What has Happened to Russian Society? in 
RUSSIA AFTER THE FALL 148 (Andrew C. Kuchins, ed., 2002). With the concentration of wealth that 
followed on post-Soviet privatization, by 1997 1.5% of the population controlled 65% of the private 
national wealth.  The rampant inflation that precipitated the devaluation of the Ruble caused nominal 
incomes and pensions to shrink as well, to 46% and 56% of their pre-collapse values respectively by 1996. 
STEPHEN WHITE, RUSSIA’S NEW POLITICS 145 (2000). For many Russians, the promise of capitalism has 
been a lie:  only one in six Russian families is better off today than they were in 1992. Twigg, supra note 
59, at 149. 
60
  Paul Klebnikov, Russian Roulette, FORBES, April 20, 1998, at 136.  
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Yukos was acquired in 1995 by Menatep Bank.61  Menatep’s principle 
shareholder, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, recognized an opportunity to take 
advantage of Amoco’s initial $300 million (US) exploration investment and 
the significant expertise that had already been transferred to Yukos.62  
Setting aside previous arrangements, Yukos offered to renegotiate the deal, 
giving itself a greater stake in production and requiring Amoco to make a 
significantly greater investment.63  Although there was a previous 
agreement, Yukos subsidiary Yuganskneftegaz64 held the government lease 
to the Priobskoye field,65 and Amoco was ultimately forced to write off its 
investment.66 
What is particularly disturbing for the foreign energy investor is the 
extent to which this pattern, first seen in the private sector,67 has been 
adopted by the government68 and used to force the restructuring of more 
critical national investment projects even after the national privatization 
process has supposedly ended.69  This strong-arm approach to regulation is 
an eerie apparition of Russia’s reposed Soviet central administration.70 
                                           
61
  Lee S. Wolosky, Putin’s Plutocrat Problem, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 18. Yukos was 
acquired by Menatep Bank, controlled by now-infamous oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in 1995 under a 
very complicated and highly suspect structured transaction.  Because the Russian government relied on the 
banking infrastructure to manage auctions of State property, registered banks were not permitted to bid in 
the auctions.  Ira W. Lieberman & Rogi Veimetra, The Rush for State Shares in the “Klondyke” of Wild 
East Capitalism: Loans-For-Shares Transactions in Russia, 29 GW J. INT’L L. & ECON. 737, 750 (1996). 
Yet, by establishing wholly-owned front companies to enter bids, Menatep was able to acquire Yukos for 
the staggeringly low price of $300 million (US).  Before being liquidated by the Russian Government in 
2003, Yukos was valued at $15 billion (US).  Marshall I. Goldman, The Oligarchs Overstep Their Bounds, 
BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 2003, reprinted in CDI RUSSIA WEEKLY, 267, #8 Aug. 1, 2003),  
http://www.cdi.org/russia/267-8.cfm. 
62
  Paul Klebnikov, The Oligarch Who Came in from the Cold, FORBES, Mar. 18, 2002. 
63
  Wolosky, supra note 61, at 18. 
64
  Yukos: Exploration and Production, Priobskoye Oil Field, Yukos corporate website, 
http://www.yukos.com/EP/Priobskoe_Oil_Field.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
65
  Erik Kreil, Oil and Gas Joint Ventures in the Former Soviet Union, report for the U.S. Department 
of Energy, Aug. 1996 (on file with the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal). 
66
  Klebnikov, supra note 60. 
67
  In other industries, examples such as Minutka Limited’s 1994 expropriation of a St. Petersburg 
Subway sandwich shop illustrate the pattern.  During the 1990s it was particularly common for foreign 
partners to visit Russia only to find that their investments no longer existed.  See Ethan S. Burger, Russian 
Legislation on Enforcement of Judicial and Arbitral Decisions, in A LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN 
RUSSIA AND THE FORMER REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R. 91 (Aviva Yakren, ed. 2000) (citing A. Belousov, 
EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN’ (No. 33, August 1997)).   
68
  To some observers it may seem that the Russian Government has taken the place of the Russian 
oligarchs, like Yukos’ Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who took an exceedingly cynical approach to the 
accumulation of economic influence.  See Klebnikov, supra note 62 (referencing Khodorkovsky’s defense 
of the lawlessness of the 1990s). 
69
  The pattern of expropriation is quite explicit.  First, foreign joint investment with a Russian 
company is encouraged.  The foreign investor brings hard currency and world-class expertise.  Second, 
there is a transfer of expertise to the Russian partner.  The Russian partner becomes increasingly competent 
in the industry, eventually believing its own expertise to be equal to that of the foreign investor.  Third, 
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From the beginning, Sakhalin II was a potential target for State action 
because it was not a joint venture; all of the partners were foreign.71  
Russia’s state gas monopoly was understandably hesitant about the prospect 
of a giant foreign competitor in the gas exporting business.  In July 2005 
Gazprom approached SEIC and offered a swap:  in exchange for a 25% plus 
one share stake in Sakhalin II, Gazprom offered Shell a 50% stake in 
Gazprom’s Zapolyarnoye-Neocomian field.72   
A few days later, SEIC announced a significant cost overrun and 
significant development delays for the Sakhalin II project.73  The overall 
costs for development were doubled from $10 billion (US), to just over $20 
billion (US), a cost increase slated to significantly put off when the Russian 
Government could share in production.74  Then, on September 18, 2006, the 
Russian government decided that the project had become undesirable, and 
began the process of removing foreign investors from the Sakhalin equation.  
Citing environmental concerns that had been raised by NGOs years earlier,75 
but about which nothing had previously been done, the Ministry of Natural 
Resources revoked key environmental permits, bringing the project to a 
halt.76 
                                                                                                                              
some roadblock is created to the project.  The books might by cooked to show an unprofitable enterprise, or 
needed land or commodities might become unavailable, or government permits might be withheld.  Fourth, 
the Russian company offers to purchase the foreign-held shares at severely sub-market prices.  The foreign 
investor, faced with no other option, typically accepts this offer.  In many cases, the offer is not even 
necessary.  The foreign investor simply takes a loss on the enterprise and leaves the Russian market. See 
Burger, supra note 67, at 92. 
70
  As one pro-Kremlin journalist explains, “Vladimir Putin slowly but steadily centralized the key 
branches of the economy.” Vladimir Shlapentokh, Intoxicated by High Oil Prices: Political Dutch Disease 
Afflicting the Kremlin, OIL & GAS JOURNAL, Nov. 6, 2006, at 18.  An anonymous American investor adds, 
“[State-controlled] Gazprom thinks of itself as the Ministry of Gas.  Its partners are supposed to shut up and 
do as they are told.”  Klebnikov, supra note 60.   
71
  Klebnikov, supra note 60. 
72
  Because of the structure of the deal, with Shell reducing its Sakhalin holdings substantially, 
Gazprom was poised to become the lead shareholder in the project. Gazprom to pay cash for Sakhalin-2, 
RosBusinessConsulting (Russia), http://top.rbc.ru/english/index.shtml?/news/english/2006/12/20/20145537 
_bod.shtml (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
73
  Andrew E. Kramer, Kremlin Revokes Oil Project Approval, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Sept. 19, 
2006, at 1. 
74
  Minister Orders Report on Sakhalin II Eco-damage, Operator admits Admits Guilt, RIA NOVOSTI, 
Oct. 25, 2006.  In the face of these costs, state-controlled Gazprom attempted to renegotiate its former 
understanding with Shell, asking that Shell’s regasification assets in North America be included in the 
exchange.  Shell refused, ending the Russian Government’s hopes to participate as a partner in the Sakhalin 
project.  Suzanne McElligott, Russia Pulls Permits on Nearly Complete Sakhalin LNG Project, 
GASIFICATION NEWS, Oct. 15, 2006, Vol. IX, No. 10. 
75
  Statement of Common Demands by Environmental NGOs Regarding the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-
2 Oil and Gas Projects, reprinted by Pacific Environment, Jan. 4, 2003, http://www.pacificenvironment.org/ 
article.php?id=258. 
76
  A Funny Shade of Green, THE ECONOMIST, September. 20, 2006, available at 
http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=7939167. 
JUNE 2007 ADMINISTRATION OF RUSSIA’S ENERGY SECTOR 681 
  
This was no Russian environmental epiphany.  When asked about the 
future of other environmentally questionable oil production projects in the 
country, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov tipped his hand, 
commenting “I do not think accords concluded on the basis of production-
sharing agreements should be revised.  Production-sharing begins once costs 
have been recovered.  But permanently increasing expenses impose onerous 
terms.”77  Russian Minister of Trade and Economic Development German 
Gref agreed that the main factor prompting government action was the rising 
cost of development.78  With significant foreign investments in jeopardy, the 
Russian government ratcheted up the pressure, threatening criminal 
prosecutions for environmental non-compliance.79   
With no choice and with the memory of Amoco’s complete loss in 
mind, Shell finally concluded that some cost recovery from Sakhalin II was 
preferable to a total loss.  On December 11, 2006, Shell offered a controlling 
stake in the project to Gazprom.80  On December 21, 2006, Gazprom 
acquired a 50% plus one share stake in SEIC, with Shell retaining a 27.5% 
stake, Mitsui holding 12.5%, and Mitsubishi 10%.81  The real beneficiary of 
the new accord was the Russian government, which will continue to collect 
tax revenues on the Sakhalin project, and, as the principle shareholder in 
Gazprom, also stands to increase its share of cost recovery from 0% to just 
over 19% during the initial recovery period.82  
                                           
77
  Existing PSA Agreements Will Remain in Force – Vice Premier, RIA NOVOSTI, Oct. 24, 2006. 
78
  Ostrovsky, supra note 22. 
79
  Prosecutors May Launch Criminal Case Against Sakhalin II, RAI NOVOSTI, Oct. 27, 2006.  At the 
same time, the same bureaucratic infighting that shaped the 1995 legislation “On Production Sharing 
Agreements” was again working to reshape governmental influence over the energy sector.  In mid-
October, officials of Russia’s law enforcement department, the Interior Ministry, searched the Ministry of 
Natural Resources offices of the officials responsible for the cancellation of the Sakhalin II permits.  
Martyn Wingrove, Russia Police raid environmental Raid Environmental Agency, LLOYD’S LIST 
INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 19, 2006. 
80
  Douglas Busvine, Shell Offers Control of Sakhalin-2 to Gazprom, REUTERS, Dec. 11, 2006, 
http://today.reuters.com/news/articlebusiness.aspx?type=tnbusinessnews&storyID=nL11674060. 
81
  Gazprom, Shell, Mitsui, Mitsubishi Sign Sakhalin II Protocol, SHELL NEWS & MEDIA RELEASES, 
Dec. 21, 2006, http://www.shell.com/home/Framework?siteId=media-en&FC2=&FC3=/media-en/html/ 
iwgen/news_and_library/press_releases/2006/sakhalin_protocol_21122006.html. 
82
  While the status of SEIC’s up-front investment in Sakhalin II is presently unknown, it is likely that 
foreign investors will either have to write off half of that investment, or increase the period during which 
they can expect its recovery, diminishing the project’s ultimate profitability.  Foreign firms are likely to 
think twice before committing resources on the scale of Sakhalin II where profitability and cost recovery 
are not assured. 
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C. The Post-Soviet Legislative Reform of the 1990s Was Flawed and 
Continues to Hamper Efforts to Attract and Secure Foreign 
Investment 
The current legal framework for PSA contracting came into existence 
on December 19, 1995 when President Yeltsin signed a compromise version 
of legislation “On Production Sharing Agreements.”83  The passage of a 
comprehensive statutory framework for PSAs is a relatively unusual feature 
of the Russian experience.84  The law was widely seen as an interim 
measure, and further amendment was expected.85  Although it provided a 
general framework, the details of individual agreements were left to be 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis by Federal and regional authorities.86   
A major revision in 199887 centralized the contracting process and 
removed regional control over project administration.  The Ministry of 
Energy,88 expecting to gain significant power from its new role as the agency 
authorized to negotiate PSAs, supported these amendments.89 Meanwhile, 
the Communist Party, drawing much of its support from the former Soviet 
administrators who still controlled regional governments,90 joined with the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and finance, customs, and tax authorities to 
oppose the legislation.  Because of political posturing,91 Russia’s PSA 
regime is not representative of a national consensus or established policy, 
                                           
83
  Federal Law No. 225-FZ on Production Sharing Agreements (Dec. 30, 1995), as amended 2004. 
84
  Samir Z. Gasimov, Pre-Legislative Formation of Petroleum Agreements in Azerbaijan in 
Comparison to Legislative Framework in Russia: Legal, Economic and Political Implications 37 (2004) 
(LL.M. Thesis, University of Washington School of Law). 
85
  CHAISTY, supra note 28, at 176.  
86
  Id. 
87
  Id. at 188. 
88
  The Ministry of Energy had introduced and strongly lobbied for its own version of Production 
Sharing legislation in 1995, naturally granting primary contracting authority to itself.  In yet another intra-
governmental turf battle, the State Duma elected to pass its own version of the legislation, granting the 
legislative branch greater authority over the agreements.  After a veto of the initial legislation by the 
Federation Council (the upper house of Russia’s Parliament), the compromise 1995 legislation was 
adopted, leaving much of the detail to federal and regional executives.  Stoleson, supra note 18, at 679-682.  
89
  CHAISTY, supra note 28, at 180.  
90
  The original 1995 legislation followed a compromise “two-key” model of decision-making.  With 
a relatively weak central Government after the Soviet collapse, the Kremlin was required to court the 
support of regional powerbrokers to accomplish anything, especially in the outlying territories of Russia’s 
far east.  Thus, under the 1995 regulatory model, the Kremlin had to seek the support of regional 
government leaders before concluding new Production Sharing Agreements.  This requirement was excised 
from the 1998 amendments, undercutting the politically influential members of the Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation (CPRF) and costing the bill Communist support.  Id. at 184. 
91
  Paul Chaisty’s superb analysis of the factionalism of 1990s Russian lawmaking indicates that 
Russia’s pro-reform Yabloko party enjoyed a consistently higher cohesion rate on PSA legislation, as the 
legislation was much less a source of internal disharmony within the pro-reform Yabloko party than within 
other factions.  See CHAISTY, supra note 28, at 179 (Table 7.2). 
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but rather a snapshot of the relative strength of a particular political faction 
during the volatile period from 1995 through 1998.  As a result, the 
legislation specifically disadvantages those groups that were politically weak 
in the 1990s, such as regional governments, creating incentives for those 
groups to undermine the resulting agreements in which they have no vested 
interest. 
As a result of a haphazard legal framework, Russian PSAs are a 
legislative splitting of a contractual baby.  Fundamentally, the agreements 
are based on the Civil Law of the Russian Federation.92  While they are to 
“provide for all necessary terms and conditions related to the use of 
subsoil,”93 many elements of the development relationship, such as land use 
and natural resources management, remain subject to the law of the Russian 
Federation.94  Thus, Production Sharing Agreements with the Russian 
Government are not the sort of “self-contained” contracts found elsewhere.95  
While in other countries the PSA structure is the “preferred form of foreign 
investment,”96 in Russia only mineral deposits that cannot be licensed under 
a traditional concession are eligible for development under a PSA.97  Finally, 
Russian PSAs are not entered into for a fixed term.  The term of exploration 
may be extended at the discretion of the foreign investor, provided that the 
project is in compliance with the agreement.98 
Particularly peculiar to the Russian experience, the government is 
authorized to make available no greater than 30% of known mineral reserves 
under a PSA scheme.99  Because of this requirement, much of the initial 
prospecting and exploration is done at State expense.  In recognition of this, 
the PSA legislation provides that the foreign investor must reimburse the 
State for the costs of surveys and geological subsoil information associated 
with the particular project.100  This seems to be a mechanism for the foreign 
investor to “buy down” the initial exploration costs, but fails because foreign 
investors are not likely to pay the exploration costs associated with 
                                           
92
  Federal Law No. 225-FZ on Production Sharing Agreements (Dec. 30, 1995), as amended 2004, 
art. 1 § 3. 
93
  Id. art. 2 § 1. 
94
  Id. art. 1 § 2.  
95
  Stoleson, supra note 18, at 683 (“ . . . any contract formed pursuant to PSA law will be shackled to 
the same problems foreign investors face under the current legislative environment.”). 
96
  Smith & Wells, supra note 32, at 586.  
97
  Gasimov, supra note 84, at 42.  
98
  Federal Law No. 225-FZ on Production Sharing Agreements (Dec. 30, 1995), as amended 2004, 
art. 5 § 2.  
99
  Id. art. 2 § 3. 
100
  Id. art. 13 § 2.  
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geographic regions found not to contain oil or gas deposits.  Thus, the risk of 
non-discovery is entirely allocated to the State.101 
Without apparent justification, and further complicating an already 
non-standard agreement, the drafters abandoned the ordinary principle that 
the agreement itself preempts conflicting national law.  Instead, the PSA 
statute provides that changes to domestic law that materially impact the 
agreement should result in the mandatory amendment of the agreement “to 
ensure that the investor obtains the commercial results which he could have 
obtained” if the legislation had not changed.102  Consistent with its lack of 
specificity, the statute leaves to the parties the definition of a process for 
making such a radical change, potentially making the agreement very 
unstable.103 
A decade after Russia’s legislative framework for the creation of PSAs 
was adopted, all of the debate surrounding that legislation seems to have 
been for naught.  Since 1995, not a single PSA has been signed in Russia 
under that statutory scheme.104  Those few PSAs negotiated prior to the 
enactment of the legislation, including Sakhalin II, remain subject to the 
provisions of the law but are themselves of questionable legal status.105  
Ultimately Russia’s failure to use PSAs as a way to encourage foreign 
energy investment—where so many less stable countries have 
succeeded106—is a cautionary tale for future investors and a prescription for 
institutional change to encourage healthy market activity. 
D. Russia’s Expropriation of the Sakhalin II Investment Has Broader 
Ramifications for Future Investment and International Trade 
The true test of Russia’s approach to foreign investment regulation, 
for which no empirical predictive formula can be applied, is Sakhalin II’s 
impact on new investment and international trade,107 rather than its impact 
                                           
101
  See, Rutledge, supra note 39, at 15 (“Since both the PA and Lunskoye fields had already been 
discovered by Russian companies, the [Sakhalin Energy Consortium] did not need to worry about the 
existence of in situ oil and gas.  So the initial element of risk was removed from the outset.”). 
102
  Federal Law No. 225-FZ on Production Sharing Agreements (Dec. 30, 1995), as amended 2004, 
art. 17 § 2. 
103
  Art. 17 § 2 foresees changes in the legislative framework not only of the Russian Federation, but 
also statutory changes enacted by subdivisions and local self-government bodies.  Although untested, this 
seems to suggest that a complete renegotiation of an agreement with the national government can be forced 
by legislative action at the regional or even municipal level—a strange sort of inverse preemption. 
104
  CHAISTY, supra note 28, at 192. 
105
  Auditing Chamber Report, supra note 47, at § 3.1. 
106
  For an in-depth analysis of the successful implementation of Production Sharing Agreements in 
Indonesia, Angola, Azerbaijan, India, Iran, and Peru, see Bindemann, supra note 33, at 67-82. 
107
  Once upon a time foreign investors in Russia were willing to write off losses due to political 
maneuvering and instability.  Investments were comparatively small, profits (when realized) were 
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on existing projects and ventures. 108  As of 2007, Russia is fast exhausting 
the pool of potential foreign firms with adequate expertise that have not 
already lost significant previous investment in Russia.  Investment is only 
practical where the risk associated with doing business is adequately 
represented in the expected rate of return.109  Sakhalin II’s collapse 
demonstrates to the international community that the Russian government is 
willing to play politics with some of the largest and most influential multi-
national companies providing the largest source of foreign income in the 
country.  Foreign firms are likely to reach the reasonable conclusion that if 
Russia’s highest-profile foreign investment is not secure, the bureaucracy 
might also take action that would destabilize smaller and less noteworthy 
projects.   
In addition to energy-sector instability, Russia’s pending WTO 
application110 provides a pressing macro-political reason for the country to 
not alienate foreign investors.  Russia’s long term economic interests 
demand WTO membership to promote market diversification.111  With raw 
materials comprising an ever decreasing percentage of Russia’s exports, the 
nation’s industries are growing increasingly sensitive to anti-dumping and 
countervailing tariff penalties imposed by developed countries against 
Russia’s exports, penalties that would be illegal under the WTO 
framework.112  The World Bank estimates that the overall impact of WTO 
                                                                                                                              
enormous, and many Russian firms could be pressured into compliance with international contract 
enforcement by the prospect of limited access to foreign markets.  This period of somewhat fringe 
investment in Russia is over.  The sheer magnitude of the agreements entered into dictate their importance.  
Burger, supra note 67, at 92. 
108
  Some have suggested that Shell’s choice to remain in a minority position within SEIC highlights 
the fact that large energy companies will continue to invest in Russia, including risk as a cost of doing 
business.  This misses the point entirely.  Sakhalin II is a legacy project:  it was begun prior to the 
enactment of the current investment regime and was virtually entirely developed by Shell and its partners 
prior to government meddling.  Shell’s choice in December of 2006 was between taking a partial loss on its 
up-front investment and taking a total loss approaching $20 billion (US).  Given this circumstance, it is 
understandable that this company would elect to remain in the Russian market, if only to mitigate what it 
could of its development costs.   
109
  See SCOTT L. HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE 37 
(2001). 
110
  On the Current State of Russia’s WTO Accession Negotiations, Ministry for Economic 
Development, http://www.wto.ru/russia.asp?f=dela&t=11 (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
111
  It is estimated that WTO membership will increase bilateral trade between Russia and its largest 
trading partner, the European Union, from $187 billion (US) (2005) to $352 billion (US).  Russia’s WTO 
Accession, Hearing before the European Parliament Committee on Int’l Trade (Nov. 21, 2006) (testimony 
ofAnders Âslund, Peterson Institute) available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm? 
ResearchID=686. 
112
  Id.   
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accession on the Russian economy is between 3.3% and 11% of GDP.113  
Yet, Russia’s unstable and often corrupt economic regulatory system 
threatens to short-circuit ongoing accession negotiations.  Additionally, a 
collapse of massive foreign investments in the highly-visible energy sector is 
likely to give support to those countries that oppose Russian membership.114   
IV. RUSSIA NEEDS A NEW MODEL FOR INVESTMENT TO ENCOURAGE 
FOREIGN FIRMS TO INITIATE NEW ENERGY PROJECTS  
Russia needs foreign investment as much as the world market needs 
Russian natural resources.  Particularly troublesome, both the Russian 
government and Russia’s burgeoning capitalist class have demonstrated that 
they are unsuitable partners for foreign firms wishing to make significant 
investments in the Russian economy.  Both Russian and foreign actors have 
begun to look outside of the formal legal framework to fashion a system of 
economic interaction that suits the particular purpose of each.  The ultimate 
problem is that the participants in this system are playing by a different set 
of rules.  Because foreign laws and international expectations prevent 
foreign firms from playing by Russian rules, the Russian government must 
erect institutions that will ensure that both it and its domestic companies act 
in accord with international standards and expectations.  
The burdens of Russian instability fall disproportionately on foreign 
investors.  Compared with Russian firms, foreign investors find themselves 
in a regulatory and public relations straightjacket.  Actions that come 
without consequences for domestic investors in Russia often either violate 
the corporate regulations of the country where a foreign firm is incorporated, 
or would lead to damaging public relations problems with more squeamish 
foreign constituencies.  For companies incorporated in the United States, the 
long reach of Federal extraterritorial jurisdiction statutes provide remedies 
for violation of U.S. law that are not available against Russian companies 
                                           
113
  Jesper Jensen, Thomas Rutherford, & David Tarr, Economy-Wide and Sector Effects of Russia’s 
Accession to the WTO, WORLD BANK, 2004, at 3, available at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu 
/resources/download/1735.pdf. 
114
  See Edward Gresser, A view from Outside: Russia And the Case For the WTO, RUSSIAN-
AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,-RUSSIAN COMMERCE NEWS (2003), available at 
http://www.russianamericanchamber.org/newsletter/aviewfromthe.html (“Less well known, and especially 
relevant in considering the WTO accession, are microeconomic and regulatory troubles.  Ministries, finding 
revenue uncertain and inexperienced with new roles as regulators rather than producers of goods, issue vast 
numbers of unnecessary regulations and license requirements simply to raise money.  This fosters 
corruption among big businesses and officials, and plagues less-connected small-scale Russian 
entrepreneurs and foreign businesses with long approval processes, unnecessary fees, and occasional 
absurdities.”). 
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engaged in the same activity.115  Fraud schemes erected by corporations that 
do business in the United States are particularly likely to elicit U.S. 
enforcement action regardless of where the firm is incorporated.116  This is 
because fraud tends to transcend international boundaries, especially within 
vertically-integrated multinational firms, and tends to have a domestic 
impact regardless of where committed.117  To avoid foreign jurisdiction, 
many Russian oil and gas companies prefer to operate through smaller 
subsidiary companies with no foreign assets, shielding the parent from 
foreign judgments through the unusually strong corporate veil associated 
with a Russian Joint Stock Company (“JSC”).118  When the Russian 
Federation Government enters the marketplace, either directly or through 
subsidiaries, the doctrine of sovereign immunity restricts enforcement to a 
significant degree.119 
Foreign investors will only continue to invest in Russia’s energy 
sector if they can be assured that they and their domestic partners will be 
playing by the same set of rules within a defined and predictable legal 
environment.  Regulation must be freed from the control of the treacherous 
                                           
115
  Particularly applicable, the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2, 
78dd-3 (1998), prohibits companies and officers of companies governed by U.S. securities regulations from 
financial dealings intended to bribe or otherwise influence foreign government officials or political 
candidates.  Such financial dealings are common practice, especially within the lower levels of the Russian 
regional bureaucracy.  Although there have been no U.S. prosecutions for Russian FCPA violations as of 
publication,  the U.S. Justice Department recently has become aggressive in investigating FCPA allegations 
and forcing criminal penalties.  See United States v. Titan Corp, 05 CR 0314-BEN (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005) 
(imposing a $13 million (US) criminal fine on top of substantial profit disgorgments for a $2 million (US) 
contribution to the re-election campaign of Beninan President Mathieu Kerekou).  In addition,  the Lanham 
TradeMark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064, allows suits in U.S. Federal court to enforce trademarks infringed 
abroad, a mechanism only practically applicable to international firms with assets in the United States.  See 
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952).  Under 18 U.S.C § 1513(d), Americans who 
conspire to kill or harm witnesses or participants in official proceedings are subject to criminal prosecution 
in the United States regardless of where the offense was committed.  In extreme cases, the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, provides domestic jurisdiction over any “civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States,” again limited by the 
caveat that recovery is only likely against entities with significant assets in the United States. 
116
  See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between 
Public and Private International Law, 76 A.J.I.L. 280, 298 (1982). 
117
  See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-§78hh, to have extraterritorial application.). 
118
  Unlike in the United States, the inviolability of a Russian JSC corporate veil is based not on a 
balancing of factors, but on a set of affirmative and clearly-defined corporate actions that create parent 
liability.  In the absence of these actions (which include commingling funds, management structures, and 
directorships) there is no basis for parent liability for subsidiary actions.  See KENNETH A. CUTSHAW & 
IGOR D. ARKHIPOV, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA 43.002 (West 2000). 
119
  See National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955) (discussing the policy reasons 
underlying the doctrine).  See also Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (declining 
to differentiate between the commercial and military activities of a foreign state in extension of sovereign 
immunity to prevent the arrest of a sovereign’s vessel for purposes of in rem jurisdiction). 
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State bureaucracy,120 agreements must be given meaning through predictable 
and functional enforcement, and investment must be secured against 
unofficial expropriation through economic manipulation.  However, for such 
a framework to have credibility with Russian constituencies, it must assure 
that Russia retains meaningful control of its natural and energy resources, 
that the proceeds of development are shared equitably, and, importantly, that 
the country is able to project the image of a great power and not of a third-
world client State.  No legal institution can, of itself, solve the crisis of trust 
in the Russian politic.  Yet, by properly understanding the legal, political, 
and cultural factors that have influenced Russia’s development, the country 
can craft institutions that take account of these factors, rather than labor 
against them.  History demonstrates that economic isolation, exploitation of 
momentarily successful industry, and alienation of foreign confidence are 
not in Russia’s long-term interest. 
V. A PUBLIC LEASING AUTHORITY SEPARATE FROM THE RUSSIAN 
GOVERNMENT COULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE STABILITY TO ENCOURAGE 
FOREIGN FIRMS TO INVEST IN RUSSIA 
In approaching the reform of Russia’s PSA framework, leaders should 
look to non-traditional approaches that have been successful in the 
management of important public resources in emergent political 
environments.  On examination, the very problems Russia faces in the 
administration of its oil and gas fields have been faced by numerous local 
governments in the development and management of their public resources.  
Many have chosen to administer those resources by establishing a single-
purpose quasi-governmental authority, a model that Russia should explore. 
A.  Public Authorities Successfully Manage Public Resources in Sectors 
that Require “Business-Like” Administration 
Political insulation of resource managers through the establishment of 
a quasi-governmental management authority has historically been effective 
in political situations somewhat similar to that currently faced in Russia.  For 
instance, the cultivation of the dry western United States created disputes 
over water, a resource that was indispensable for irrigation and thus for the 
economic viability of most rural areas.121  A major problem was that water 
                                           
120
  One Russia observer has commented, “Russia suffers not from too free a market but from 
corruption thriving on the excessive regulations erected by a large and pervasive state.”  Anders Aslund, 
Russia’s Collapse, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 64.  
121
  JOHN BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 142 (1957). 
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resources, much like oil and gas, tended to transcend local and regional 
administrative districts.122  Lack of cooperation between state and local 
entities meant that upstream water resources were often mismanaged, to the 
detriment of downstream users.123  For many western states and western 
landowners, the solution was the development of special irrigation districts:  
local administrative bodies that overlay the existing administrative map and 
are managed by professional administrators under the supervision of an 
elected or appointed board.124  Beginning in the early 20th Century, many 
American states created “Public Authorities,” charged by statute with a 
singular purpose, insulated from political influence, subject to suit at law, 
and often run by professional administrators.125   
Public authorities are now regularly created126 to develop projects 
(such as sport stadiums, utilities, or transportation infrastructure) and to 
administer public resources (such as ports, public parks, and irrigation).127  
At the most basic level, these entities are designed to serve as quasi-public 
corporations incorporated for the benefit of the public.  They are conceived 
with the twin aims of insulating a business-like function from political 
manipulation while benefiting from the professional managerial expertise 
that many politicians lack.128 
Although the public authority owes its existence to the State, it is, in 
many cases, freed from the process-oriented requirements of the bureaucracy 
and can therefore operate more efficiently.129  It is impossible, and in any 
                                           
122
  Id. at 140. 
123
  Id. 
124
  Id. at 141-49. 
125
  OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, 2D 26-32 (West 2001).  Although voluntary 
irrigation districts had existed since the late 1800s, the Port Authority of New York is widely recognized as 
the first quasi-governmental district in the United States.  The Port Authority was created in 1921 by the 
States of New York and New Jersey to administer and develop the port. 
126
  For an example of an early approach to public authorities internationally, see SIDNEY WEBB, 
ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Vol. 4, 239-241 (1963).  In 1662, the cities of London and Westminster, 
England, pioneered such an entity with Parliament’s statutory authorization of “Improvement 
Commissioners” to regulate the building of roads and sewers between the two cities as well as to authorize 
the removal of interfering structures and provide for “rakers” to clear the roads.  In authorizing the 
Commissioners, Parliament recognized that the competing parochial interests of the London and 
Westminster governments had resulted in the mismanagement of road construction and maintenance, and 
that this problem could be addressed by building an entity that could adequately encompass the interests of 
both cities.  
127
  Alternative Financing Mechanisms for Environmental Protection, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION 
AND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Aug. 7, 1992, at 14. 
128
  See Jameson W. Doig, “If I See a Murderous Fellow Sharpening a Knife Cleverly . . . ”: The 
Wilsonian Dichotomy and the Public Authority Tradition, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Vol. 43, No. 4 
(1983), at 292.  (“Many government agencies and their officials have aspired to these twin goals of political 
insulation and sophisticated managerial competence, but few have achieved either in a significant 
degree.”). 
129
  See id. at 92-93. 
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case undesirable, to entirely insulate any public institution from the forces of 
politics.  The purpose of the public authority is not to supplant either the 
state or private enterprise, but rather to complement both, serving as both a 
conduit for interaction and a buffer against manipulation.130  The particular 
advantage of vesting an economic entrepreneurial enterprise with a quasi-
governmental status is that such a body can exercise government-like 
functions.  Some of these functions include the issuance of public credit, the 
exercise of eminent domain, the conference of tax exemptions, and the 
creation of monopolies.  All of these tasks would be proscribed to ordinary 
business entities, but are necessary for the proper administration of a public 
resource.131   
In terms of political legitimacy, a public authority benefits from the 
fact that its constituency (and its level of accountability to that constituency) 
can be specifically and strategically prescribed.132  While managers that are 
directly elected are likely to be no less independent than other elected 
officials from the same district, those appointed by the executive for 
extended terms are likely to have a greater degree of political 
independence.133  Often, however, the purpose of creating a public authority 
is to balance the competing interests of various government entities, such 
that the controlling political objectives of each are weighed against the costs 
to the others.  In irrigation districts, for instance, supervising directors were 
typically elected from amongst riparian land owners according to the 
number of parcels owned.134  By contrast, authorities for the management of 
public housing usually answer to other government entities rather than to the 
electorate, and directors are typically appointed by a number of other local 
elected officials.135   
Importantly, because public authorities are created by the government, 
they are often given policy as well as economic mandates.136  The State of 
                                           
130
  Gerald Fetner, Public Power and Professional Responsibility: Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins 
of the Public Authority, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1977) at 22-24.  A 
key characteristic of the special district is that it can be legislatively required to undertake endeavors or 
projects that are either so risky or so unprofitable that private enterprise would be unwilling to do the same.  
By publicly absorbing this risk, the special district can, in effect, manufacture a stable or healthy market 
situation, creating space for private industry to engage in profitable management or administration of public 
resources.  At the same time, the special district can fulfill a regulatory role, answering to a public mandate 
to provide services required or desired by the state.  Id.   
131
  ROBERT G. SMITH, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, SPECIAL DISTRICTS, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  91 
(1964). 
132
  See BOLLENS, supra note 121, at 142. 
133
  Doig, supra note 128, at 297. 
134
  Id. at 146. 
135
  Id. at 31. 
136
  For the implications of these split mandates, see SMITH, supra note 131, at 56-57. 
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Washington, like other states, vests public irrigation districts with the split 
purposes of stewarding watersheds, leasing water rights, and managing 
hydroelectric public utilities.137  These are diverse and often countervailing 
purposes which the district directors are empowered to weigh and balance 
independent of State or local interference. 
B. The Many Benefits of Non-Governmental Administration Could Add 
Predictability, Efficiency, and Transparency to Russia’s Oil and Gas 
Sectors 
While never before used on such a scale, the public authority structure 
could plausibly be adapted to the administration of exploration and 
development of Russian oil and gas.  To accomplish the goal of investment 
stability, the management of energy concessions must be removed from the 
direct control of the legislature and the executive.  While the state Duma and 
the President should be involved in setting general policy for energy 
exploration, the granting and regulation of specific concessions should be 
vested in an independent quasi-governmental Public Leasing Authority 
(“PLA”).  That authority, governed by an independent board of directors, 
would be competent to administer energy concessions within a designated 
geographic region of Russia.   
The PLA should be authorized under federal legislation for the split 
purposes of administering a geographically-defined oil or gas interest; 
granting concessions to foreign and domestic companies for exploration and 
development; setting environmental, health, and safety regulations not lower 
than those established in Federal law at the time that the concession is 
granted;138 interpreting and applying those regulations; and granting all 
necessary permits and authorizations within the defined area related to the 
project.  As part of the arrangement, the Russian Federation would lease the 
mineral resources within the defined area to the PLA in exchange for royalty 
payments calculated to include all revenues not necessary for the 
administration of the PLA, including PLA-sponsored exploration and 
                                           
137
  See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 87.84.005 (1963), 87.03.013 (1979), 87.03.010 (1923). 
138
  The importance of setting a baseline of social regulation below which oil and gas concessions 
cannot fall is obvious:  because the externalities of oil and gas development (including environmental costs, 
resettlement of populations, and public safety) have the greatest impact on the Russian people as a whole, 
their elected representatives must have a role in defining the minimum standards in each area.  Yet, because 
Russian politicians have demonstrated that they are willing to use such regulation to accomplish political 
goals, the minimum standards must remain stable throughout the life of the concession.  At the same time, 
recognizing that changes in technology and international standards may precipitate a need to make those 
standards more stringent, the board of the PLA, insulated from countervailing incentives, must be 
empowered to make regulatory changes. 
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development costs.  By creating such an entity, the Russian government 
would create a political “buffer” between the state and the international 
investor, ameliorating many of the causes of instability in the current regime. 
While removal of public resource administration from the elected 
organs of government may raise republican ire, a government’s goals can 
sometimes best be accomplished with recognition that elected leaders are not 
themselves best qualified for dispassionate administration.  Even in the 
ostensibly most democratic societies, the leasing of subsoil resources has 
traditionally been removed from politically-sensitive institutions, in 
recognition of the opportunity for political manipulation and favoritism in 
the granting of development rights.139  By delegating administration of 
leases to administrative agencies, these countries separate the “policy” 
aspect of leasing (which is retained by the legislature) from the 
“administrative” aspect, which is delegated to a disinterested third party.  
While the United States and Britain allow leasing decisions to be 
made by executive departments, they are also countries with long and 
established histories of separating the ministerial and political functions of 
those departments.140  Russia, by contrast, has no such history.141  It is 
therefore unrealistic to suggest that the Russian bureaucracy should act like 
its American or British counterparts.  Political manipulation is a fact of 
                                           
139
  Indeed, in much of the world it has been recognized that traditionally democratic institutions may 
not be best suited for the management of commercial enterprises.  In an 1887 article, Woodrow Wilson 
aptly summarized the propriety of borrowing commercial and monarchic structures for republican public 
purposes: “If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the 
knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it; and so, if I see a monarchist dyed 
in the wool managing a public business well, I can learn his business methods without changing one of my 
republican spots.” Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol. II 
No. 2 (June 1887) 197, 220.  In the United States, management of outer-continental shelf oil leases (those 
outside of the jurisdiction of the states) is vested in the Secretary of the Interior.  See Outer-Continental 
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a).  Similarly in the United Kingdom, leasing of North Sea oil reserves 
is controlled by the Department of Trade and Industry under a delegation from the Secretary of State. 
Christopher F. Richardson, The Influence of Offshore Leasing Regimes on Commercial Oil Activity: An 
Empirical Analysis of Property Rights in the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea, 17 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 97, 105 (2004). 
140
  See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, (1765 KB) 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 708 (holding the Earl of 
Halifax amenable to suit at common law for illegal issuance of a warrant, and explaining the distinction 
between ministerial and discretionary functions of public officials), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/trials/entick/entick_v_carrington.htm; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 
U.S. 738, 839-846 (1824) (recognizing the authority of the federal courts to issue injunctions against state 
ministers when their actions are or threaten to be in contravention of federal law).  
141
  Under both the Tsar and the Soviet Union, government ministers acted subject to either the 
direction of executive authority or their own self-interests, often giving little thought to whether their 
actions comported with established legislative policy or the statutory functions of their offices. See 
Anastasia Nesvetailova, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Sussex, Putin and the Return of 
Empire? Reconstituting Russia’s Political Economy after Crisis (Apr. 18-20, 2001) (unpublished article, on 
file with the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, quoted with permission of the author). 
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Russian bureaucratic administration.  The only way to separate resource 
administration from the political equation is to separate it entirely from the 
Government. 
C. A Successful PLA Must Be Both Politically Responsive and 
Economically Responsible to Capture Domestic Political Legitimacy 
and Attract Foreign Investment  
In order to meet its split mandates of profitably developing energy 
resources while safeguarding the environment, workers, and communities, 
the PLA must manifest 3 important features:  1) it must be self-contained,142 
solely empowered to grant energy concessions, administer all attendant 
matters within its realm, and authorized to make findings of fact subject to 
judicial deference; 2) it must be truly independent, governed by directors 
appointed by multiple government levels for extended fixed terms,143 and 3) 
it must be subject to suit and authorized to bring suit in a designated court of 
international arbitration, the decisions of which must be made enforceable in 
Russia notwithstanding incongruence with domestic public policy. 
1. A Self-Contained Entity Will Be Less Susceptible To Outside Political 
Pressures 
The primary rationale for encapsulating oil and gas concessions 
within the authority of a single quasi-governmental body is the same as that 
for which developing countries around the world look to PSAs:  stability and 
predictability.  Namely, ordinary PSAs are self-contained agreements 
governing all aspects of the development relationship, and providing 
predictability for foreign investors who rely upon explicitly defined future 
rights and obligations.  In the Russian context, however, companies invested 
through PSAs remain dependent on the Russian government and various 
departments within the bureaucracy for permits, financial authorizations, and 
development permissions.  These disparate parts of the bureaucracy are less 
concerned with profitable development, future investment, and sustainable 
management than they are with elevating their own influence.  Like an 
                                           
142
  The reader will recall that a “self-contained” entity was a principle rationale behind the adoption 
of the PSA framework to begin with.  See Stoleson, supra note 18, at 672.  This principle is particularly 
important in the context of an otherwise unstable political environment, but was never fully realized in the 
Russian context.  Through removal from Government control, the Public Leasing Authority is likely to be 
more successful in achieving this goal.  
143
  For a perspective on the importance of independent directors, and their relative scarcity in the 
context of public authorities, see Jonathan Rosenbloom, Can a Private Corporate Analysis of Public 
Authority Administration Lead to Democracy?, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 851, 891-92 (2006). 
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irrigation district or port authority, a PLA would be a forum for 
consideration of all interests.  It would balance the desire for current profit 
and production against the future interest in sustainable and socially-
responsible development.  Perhaps most importantly, the PLA would provide 
a single entity with which the international investor could interact, allowing 
for the development of relationships and understandings to transcend the 
political immediacies of the day. 
2. Independence from the Central Government Will Diminish the 
Likelihood that Oil and Gas Contracts Will Be Used to Accomplish 
Unrelated Political Objectives 
In Russia, government involvement in a private enterprise has become 
synonymous with executive control.144  Where the government has gained a 
controlling share in domestic corporations, it has used that stake to filter 
Government policy through entities that have become private in name only.  
Because of this track record, it is important, for both appearances and 
function, that the directors of the PLA have the freedom to act independently 
of the Russian government.  Yet, those chosen to administer the industry 
supporting Russia’s fragile economy must be charged to act in the country’s 
long-term interest.  Leadership must be both insulated from and responsive 
to political pressures.  This seemingly oxymoronic end can be met, to a 
degree, by providing for the appointment of PLA directors by the national, 
regional, and local governments for extended fixed terms.   
Creating an independent entity to administer oil and gas leasing 
presents an opportunity for the development of political legitimacy through 
federalism.  Russia is a federation of 88 regional governments, including 3 
autonomous republics.145  Given the widespread environmental, public 
health, and labor implications of immense infrastructure investments, it is 
important from a democratic perspective that local voices be represented.  
Popular accedance can be enhanced and regionalism overcome by reversing 
the centralization of the 1998 PSA legislation amendments and designating 
director positions to be appointed by the regional and local governments in 
the effected areas.  
                                           
144
  PETER BAKER AND SUSAN GLASSER, KREMLIN RISING 125 (2005). One should also note that there 
are few examples, either contemporary or historical, of a truly independent institution in Russia, 
particularly in the government sector.  President Putin’s efforts of the last several years, aimed at 
consolidating and centralizing government power and influence, have further diminished the likelihood of 
the emergence of such an institution.  This Comment does not, therefore, purport to suggest what is likely 
to occur organically, but rather posits a suggestion for what may work if prudently adopted. 
145
  CIA World Factbook: Russia, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rs.html (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
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For too long, the regulators of the energy sector have been beholden to 
the central government and to their own conflicting interests.  Independence, 
to the extent achievable, must be premised on freedom to make decisions 
counter to the political and economic expediencies of the short term without 
economic or political conflicts of interest. 
3. In the Wake of Sakhalin II, International Investors Will Demand 
Robust Enforcement Mechanisms 
Ultimately, any structural solution is meaningless without a significant 
mechanism for enforcement.  One of the primary obstacles to foreign 
investment in Russia’s energy sector is the lack of recourse in the event of 
contractual breach.  Foreign investors’ fears are likely to be exacerbated by 
the heavy-handed way in which the Russian government has dealt with 
regulation of the Sakhalin II project.  As Mikhail Khodorokovsky’s 
generation has shown itself to be both financially and politically savvy, and 
because the Russian courts have shown themselves to be unable to enforce 
judgments to a meaningful degree,146 a new and sophisticated mechanism of 
enforcement must be crafted to meet international standards and demands.  
In developing an effective enforcement mechanism, Russia should 
take advantage of the increasing credibility and gravitas of international 
arbitration.  Allowing international arbitration as the dispute resolution 
tribunal of first instance for disputes arising between the PLA and the 
foreign investor has several significant advantages over relying on domestic 
enforcement.  First, it provides a strong mechanism for Russian enforcement 
against the foreign investor.  Because the international arbitrator’s award is 
more likely than a domestic Russian award to be enforced in the foreign 
jurisdiction where the oil or gas company is incorporated,147 the foreign 
investor is more likely to be responsive to arbitrator’s decisions. 148  Second, 
because the PLA will inevitably be engaged in international commerce, 
resort to international arbitration provides a significant means of 
enforcement even if an award cannot be recovered against the PLA’s assets 
                                           
146
  According to information provided by Russia’s Ministry of Justice, fewer than half of Russia’s 
domestic court judgments are enforced.  Burger, supra note 67, at 91. 
147
  See generally Alla Naglis, The Status of Foreign Judgments and Arbitration in Russia, in A 
LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA AND THE FORMER U.S.S.R. 110, 120 (Aviva Yakren, ed. 
2000) (discussing the enforceability of international arbitration awards in Russia and abroad). 
148
  Currently, 141 nations are signatories to the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.  See UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW, STATUS: 1958 – CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL 
AWARDS, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ NYConvention_ 
status.html. 
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in Russia.  With an arbitrator’s award in hand, an aggrieved party is more 
likely to be able to attach the PLA’s foreign assets, as well as to garnish 
revenue generated by other foreign investors before it is paid to the Russian 
party.149  Finally, international arbitration in a mutually agreeable forum will 
provide necessary external oversight and bring a level of transparency to the 
agreements that is not present in the current system. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Russia is at a turning point no less significant than that which it faced 
in 1991.  As the world marches toward a borderless international free trade 
zone, Russia is deciding just what type of power it wishes to be.  The energy 
sector, while admittedly unique in many ways, provides insight into the 
future development of Russia’s foreign investment prospects.  In the near 
term, Russia will not be a model of American or European liberal 
democracy.  Similarly, its oil and gas industry should not be expected to 
organically follow the relatively laissez-faire model of the West.  The blatant 
and highly-public expropriation of the Sakhalin II project is likely to make 
this realization clear to international observers.   
One way to expose the Russian public to a transparent, responsible, 
and predictable political institution is to create one in Russia’s most 
important economic sector.  At the same time, the temptation for Russian 
politicians eager to manipulate the energy sector may simply be too great.  
For the same reasons that make energy an obvious test-bed for the 
development of responsible institutions, the sector is prone to political 
manipulation by those seeking to capitalize on Russia’s new-found 
prosperity.  By demonstrating that it is willing to expropriate successful 
projects, even high profile projects, without significant compensation, the 
Russian Government has essentially indicated that private investment in 
Russia is not secure.  This threatens to undermine Russia’s efforts to attract 
the foreign expertise that it still needs to modernize its economy, and 
threatens to destabilize Russia’s efforts to join the international marketplace, 
including the World Trade Organization. 
                                           
149
  For a foreign perspective on recovering international arbitration awards that are not recognized by 
Russian law, see Jeffrey M. Hertzfeld, Russian Corporate Governance: The Foreign Direct Investor’s 
Perspective, presented at the Conference on Corporate Governance in Russia, sponsored by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, United States Agency for International 
Development, and World Bank 7, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/55/47/1921803.pdf  (even 
when the Russian courts will not recognize an arbitrator’s award, it is possible to recover a judgment 
against foreign assets located in a country that will recognize it).  
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Establishment of a Public Leasing Authority could be an essential 
component of Russia’s new approach to energy administration.  Removed 
from the volatile Middle East, a major economic player, and the world’s 
leading exporter of energy, Russia is in a unique position to be a world 
leader in attracting foreign investment.  With that investment could come 
infrastructure improvement, economic diversification, greater 
industrialization in the Far East, and, ultimately, greater political stability.   
Yet, to realize this promise, Russia must set aside its traditional skepticism 
of foreign investment and engage the world marketplace on international 
terms.  By establishing a mechanism to professionally and independently 
manage Russia’s energy resources, the country would signal to the world 
that it is finally serious about developing a predictable and stable legal 
environment for regulating its most essential industry. 
